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Abstract: 
 
Corporate governance (CG) has been a topic of hot discussion not only in business 
world but also in academic world. This is all due to its complex and scandalous 
nature. Therefore it is always important to shed some light academically and perform 
analysis and autopsy on corporate governance failures such as Commerce Bank 
(1991) Enron (2001), Adelphia (2002), and World Com (2002). 
 
This study investigates the relationship between the board characteristics (board size, 
board composition, board meeting, board interlock, CEO age and CEO family) and 
firm performance (ROA) based on the annual reports of 102 companies listed on the 
Saudi Market starting from 2010 to 2012. The sample of non-financial firms was 
collected from Saudi Market (Tadawul) as well as from the director's profile in the 
annual reports. 
 
The results of this study find that board meeting, board interlock and CEO age have 
no effect on firm performance in the selected sample while board size has strong 
positive relationship with firm performance (ROA). In addition, it is also noteworthy 
to note that the relationship between board composition and CEO family is 
significant negatively. It is recommended that future research take into consideration 
the investigation of relationship between corporate governance before issuing the 
Code of Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia and after issuing them in order to 
investigate the differences during longer period. 
 
Keywords: corporate governance, Saudi Arabia, Code on Corporate Governance, 
firm performance, board characteristics. 
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 CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Corporate governance (CG) has been a topic of interest all around the world 
especially in academic circles when some of the corporate scandals and failures came 
to limelight such as Commerce Bank (1991), Enron (2001), Adelphia (2002) and 
World Com (2002). Therefore it has been the time of need that corporations had to 
adopt new business policies and technologies to ensure transparency and 
accountability. In return this will help attracting investors and capital funds will also 
help offer financial stability with economic prosperity. No matter how many 
measures and cautions are taken today’s business still operate in competitive and 
risky environs.  
In developed economies there is an academic debate and lot of literature available on 
the issues pertaining to gap between good and bad corporate governance mechanisms 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In order to reduce corporate complexities and minimize 
corporate governance failure there are many international bodies have been formed 
for example International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). According to 
report “Principles of Corporate Governance” issued by the OECD issued in 1998 and 
2004, corporate governance should focus on the performance of long-term business 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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